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ARNOLD & PORTER

October

9;

1990

:::~:=e~ F~U~a~fi¢~ pPr
F.

R~:

C:r.i. t;i.que of Co111?t.i. t~ti.<;m~l Il?l?\lel?

F~il?~Ci

by Section 103(a) in. Williams/Coleman
Compromise Version ·Of R.R. 48~~- __ --~ _

Although the new compromise version of H.R. 4825
purport$ to deny funding only for obscene works based on
the supreme court's Miil.er v. California standards, in
fact. section lOJ(a) of the bill may create new,
unconstitutional grant approval standards.

Section

103 (b) reqtiire!; t_hat, in grantmaking regulatdons and

pl:."ocedures whieh the NE.A shall promulgate, the Chairman
11

shail ensure'' that applications a:re

jud,g~Q,

nQt Qnly in

terms of artcistic excellence and merit but also
into consideration

9ene~~l E?t~:nda:c:ds

11

takin9

of dece_ncy and

respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
Ainerican public."
new fundin9

.This provisi.ol'.l c;:l.ea::rly

app:;-ov~l

up two

§;et~

l:nirdles, beyond the obscenity

criterion, whieh are patently unconsti tut.i.c;m~l
What do these new

"1?ta11d,c:t..:c:ci~" m~an?

!

How can one

deterir.iine whether a particular work of art is within
''general standa:rCil? of decency" or respects "the
l:;>~liefl?

and values of the A:iilerican public''?

II?

divers~
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:Michelangelo's David "decent"?

Would a paroQ.y c:>f

revered figures like Washington, Jefferson or Lincoln be
"disrespectful" to our t:tilttiral heritage?
l~.Jlq

what :i..E? "tlie

~erican

public''?

As the

supreme court has emphasized, "People in different
states;

va~y

in t:bei:r tae;tee; an<i attitudes, and this

dive:r;e:i..ty :i..e; not tQ pe
im
-- p osed
- - - unif
-- -- - o:rmi
- - -- - t_y-. ''
33

(1973).

Chri~tic;in~!

unitarian,

st~a?l<tle<;i

by the absolutism of

Millet v! California, 413 Q.$. 15,

Whose ''diverse beiie:fs'' .... ,.,. Fundamentalist
Q:r;thQc}o~

Q"ewiE?h, MQE?J.em,

Ch~:l,1:1t:ia?l

Sc:l,em::e,

or all of them -- provide the test for

":re§pectftJlne~i;;"?

Mid wboi;;e "valuei;;"?

These funding standards are so broad as to have
no specific content meaning; they permit an
aQ111i_riii;it:ratqr to make speech...;based decisions without any
fixed standards.

Consequently, they will c;:li:ill

c~eat:i:ve

output because an artist simply will have no clear
indication of their meaning.

Aii of these

considerations have led the supreme cou:rt c;:c;ms:i.i;;t:.ently
to hold vague and amorphous content standards such as
these to be unconstitutional.
Moreover, these provisions
procedural concerns which

were

~a:l,se

aga:l,:ri_

eff~ct.i.vely

~e~ious

<iealt with in

tlie Q):)i;icen:i..ty conte:>et by removing the basic
constitutional

9-et:e~inations

from a bureaucrat's desk

and placing tbe:m in the hands of a court.

These two new
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standards could be read to require the Chairman to be
prepareci tQ c:le:f1end to any public of-:fici(ll that a
:pa~ticu:t,ar

9rant

qe9E!rl't; a,nc:i_

w~s

~E!$PE!Qtful,

thE!

PE!C~l.l~E!

Chairman may be said 'to "ensure" 'that NE.A gran'ts are so
endowed.
The Supreme Court has emphasized tha't s'tandards
of Vagueness are especially stringent in tbe Fi:r$1;

In

Amendment conte)C1;.
u •.. s.

610,

620

( 1976),

Hyn~s

y. Mavor of Oradell, 425

the Court stressed that

"stricte~

v~9Ue!le$$ ~~Y ~E!

standards of permissible statutory

applied to a statute having a x:>otentia11y inhibiting
effe<::t on §peech; a man may t.he less be required to act
~t

:t:iif3 peril bere, because 'the free dissemination of

ideas may be the loser. ''
Shuttlesworth
147, 150-51 (1969),
of

~qcti ~Jl1Q~PtlQUf31Y

conte~t

v~

City_ of: Birm-:i..ngh_am., 394 U.S.

exel'il.plifie~

tlle Co\l,rt•s intolerance

vague standards as

11

decency 11 in the

of :ref3tt"ictions upon First. Amendment :freedoms.

fn Shuttlesworth, the court

st~c1t

down as

uncons'titutdonally vague a statute that

E!l1C~o~c:he4

on

First Amendment freedoms b¥ permitting c:ity officials 'to
deny

~ p~_:rgqe

permit if the officials believed that

•)decency, gooQ. order, morals or convenience require th<it
;ft

be refused" (emphasis added).

The

cou~t ~t~t;ed

tha't

"i:;ubjest.ing the exercise of Fi:rst @en®ent freedoms to
[rest:rictions] without narrow, objective, and definite
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standards . • • is ti.ficOnsti tqtional. i•

Id..

~ee

also

Pope v. Iiiinois, 481 u. s. 4·97, 504 (1987) cse:a.1ia., .J.
concurring) (content restrictions on art wouid require
the interpretation ot

a:rtwo:r~s

thllt !Dc;!,Y be

~l.l)]:::>igv.ou_$,

obscure, or unintelligible to some, and therefore are
especiaiiy prone to arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement); Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422
u~s.

(statute barring depictions of

205, 213 (1975)

nudity is

unconstj.tqt;l.c;m~lly va,9"Y,~;

it

":migb~

P+ob.i):)1t

newsreel shots oft.he opening of an art exhibit").
The notion of "disrespectf'1_l" $peech ie; similarly
unconstitutionally vague.

In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.

Wilson, 343 u.s. 495 (1952); the Court struck down a
iicensin9

requi:re~ent

to be censored.

tbat allowed "sacrilegious" films

The cou_rt

wrc>'t~:

In seeking to apply the board and ailinclusive defifiitioh Of HsacrilegiOUS 11
. • . the censor is set adrift upon a
boundless sea amid a myriad o~
conflicting currents of :religious
views, witl'l no charts but those
provided by the most vocal ancl powe:rfu_1
orthoc:lo~ie5'· • • •
Under such a
standard "the most careful and tolera11t
censor wouid find it virtually
impossible to avoid favoring one
religion over another.
Id.

~t ~04-05.

Justice

In his concurring opinion in Burstyn,

Fran~fu_:rtei;

5'tated that "[t]o allow such vague,

indefinable power$ of censorship is bound to have
stultifying c9n_s;equences on the creat,ive procei;s of
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... 5 -

& PORTER

iit.erature and art • .-.
.F.ilms v.

~-i~~,

Ninth ci:rc-uit
regulatione

Id. at

531.

Likewise, in Buiifrog

847 F.2g 502, Sl.3-14 (9t.h. Ci:t:!. J,;988), t.he
st~c]{

down a,s

tl'l~t d~n:ied

~ncc;m~tit:~tionally

va,giJ.e

c:::ertification tQ 1t1.ateriale

''which appear to have as their purpose or effect to
attack or discredit economic;
views or practices."

Id.

rel,;i.gi¢4$, or p¢litic:a1

~t. ~o~..

Tb~ Co~-~t

Sitl:!e$s;eQ.

t.bat "[s]uch content-based distinctions are patently
offensive to the First Amendment.''

Even setting aside the.l.J;
standards set by

FI·R~

Id. at

inh.e:r~nt

511.

va,gv.ene$i;, the

.rv,n afoul of long-established

4e~~

First Amendment principles.

While congress may

coni;;titutionally impose sanctions for obscene speech
wl1Jcb ii; a foJ:"ID, of expression not. protected by the First
Amendment -- H.R. 4.825 reaches far beyond the obscene in
these two new standards.

Under weii-estabi.ished

const.i'C:tit.ionai principles; '-'indecent" speech.

~nd

''disrespectful'-' speech a:re botll protected by the First
Amendment, which flatly forbid.s :rei;;t:ric::tions on the
e~ression

of an idea oh the mere ground that the

may be offensive or

ide~

disagreeable~

First, "i11q,ec:::ent 11 speech does not. fall within the
scc;:>pe of t.he obscenity exception apg, tberefore, is
accorc;l.e4

:P:ro~Q.

First Amendment protection.

communications v. FCC, 109

s.

In Sable

ct. at 2836, t.he supreme

Court stressed that '' [ s] e~u_g.l expression which is

- 6 -

i~nciece:rrt ~:rqt

nqt c;>l;>e;cene ie;

Amendment.''

In FCC v ~

p~c;>tecteci l;>y

Pacif~ca

the f

j_~st

Foundation, the court

noted. that ''t:he normai d.e:finit:ion of

1

indecency• merely

refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of
morality.''

438 u.s. 726, 740 (197$).

The

co~rt

emphasized that "indecent" materials are not necessarily
obscene, and that materials can be
tne absence of prurient appec;ll..

even in

''indecent'~

Id.

Merely

11

i_ndecent"

works do not meet. the Miller test: and are therefore

Pt'QtecteQ. l;_>y tbe First; Amendment.

-

.

1

be meant by "deeency" ""'""' and the

term may wel.i be
Fi:r~t

unconstitutionally va9ue -- the
stringently limits

Thus, whatever may

~est~ict;i.on§> Ql'I.

Alnend.ment

:i_._nciec;:erit §lpeegb,

<;>~

art.
second, the
works "respect

propQ~eQ.

.

criterion that artistic

di~erse

beliefs and values" is

part:icuiarly repugnant to court

p~ec:ecient.

'rlle

regulation of "disrespectful" speech is compieteiy
inconsistent with the "bedrock

p~inc:iple ~ncierlying

the

that the government may not
prohibit the expresi,;ion Qf

~n

idea simply because

society finds the idea i:tsei:f offensive or
1 In Carlin Communications v. FCC, the ~eC:Qllcl Circcuit
emphasized that "Wer~ the te:rlJl 'inqec;:ent' to be given
meaning other than Miller Qpscenity, we believe the
statute wquJ,ci l;:>e unconstitutional." 837 F.2d 546, ~60
(2d Cir.), cert •. denied, l,09 s.ct:. 305 (1988).
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disagreeable."

~544~

Id. at

'rbui;, even i;pee9b t.bCit ii;

''doubtless 9ross and repu,gnant. in the

eye~

of 111.<:>s;t" or

that "may h_ave a.n adverse elll.otiQnal impact Qn the
audience" is protected by the First Amendment.
Magazine v.
1
'

i.n

Hustler

Falwell, 108 S. Ct. a76, 879, 882 {1988).

(AJ ny sug9es1;.io:ri thCit tbe government's; interest

~n1pp~es;s;ing

sPeeQb becomes; more weighty as popular

opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First
Amendment."

United states v. Eichman, 58 L.W. at

cme fu11c;:tic:m of

a.~t

4746.

ii:;; t9 c;:na.llenge, not merely

ente:rtain, its viewers:
principal "function of tree i;;peec;:b
under ou~ i;y~tem Qf gQvernment is to
invite c;lii;p~te. It may ind.eed ];>est
serve its; high P'Y.!:P9se wnen it induces
a conqition 9! Yn:res;t:, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to ~nge:r."
[AJ

Texas v. Johnson, 109

v. Chicago, 337 u.s.

s .. ct.

at

2544,

ctUOtinq Terminiello

l, 4 (l.949).

CONCLUSION

Thus, the decency and disrespect provisi9:ris; of
section 103 (a) in the com:p:rol'l)ise veri;;ic:>n of ll.R. 4925

have serious const:i.tutio11Cil implications.
subject matter of the
p~Qtected,

artwor~ i~

Because the

c9nstitutionally

Congress cannot. d.iscri:ndnate on t:t:ie

that suJ:>ject matter in making grants.
court ruled long a9o:

l:;>~i;ii;

As the Supreme

of

-
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Under our system of government there is
~n ~ccQ;J.1.U11QciCltion ~0¥ the wicle$t
varieties of tastes and ideas. What is

good literature, what has educational
value, what is i;efined public:
infonnation, what is good art, varies
with individual.s as it does from one
generation-to another. There dotibtless
would be a contrariety of views

concerning Cervantes' Don

Qp.j.xot~,

Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis, or
Zola's Nana. But a requirement that
literature or art conform to some norm

i>resc~ibe4

i;,y.

~ii-otficl~i ~J,U~(;~i;-Qf-~n

iQ.eQl,ogy f cn~~:i.gn to QlJ.~r $Y~t.em. • • •
f:i:;"Ql!l tfie IlJ.lJ.ltitqcie of coID.peting
offerings the public: will pick and

choose.

Hannegan v. Esau_ire, Inc., :327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946).

